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This paper assesses the impacts of the Northeast Dairy Compact (NEDC) and retail oligopoly 
power on fluid milk prices in Boston. Empirical results reveal that price increases due to 
oligopoly power outweighed those caused by the NEDC by nearly seven times. In fact, markups 
are estimated at approximately 25% of the retail milk price, translating into approximately a little 
less than $0.75/gallon. We also estimated that only around two-thirds of the raw milk price 
changes were passed forward to consumers. This helps explain why consumer prices have come 
down only little after elimination of the NEDC. In fact, the new milk income loss contract 
program, which basically provides partial price subsidies to farmers, has contributed to low raw 
milk prices that have generated substantial benefits to milk processors and retailers, modest 
benefits to farmers and consumers, all at the expense of taxpayers. 
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Boston consumers pay considerably more for milk than their counterparts in many other 
major cities in the Northeast (e.g., New York City). Researchers and policy makers have pointed 
to one of two culprits as the cause of supra-normal retail prices: (a) the de facto exercise of 
market power through public policies such as the Northeast Dairy Compact (NEDC) that 
increase the price of raw milk paid to farmers (Bailey, 2003; Balagtas and Sumner, 2003; 
Cotterill and Franklin, 2001; Lass et al., 2001) and (b) the exercise of private market power--the 
ability of firms to control price or quantity in the marketplace--by Boston supermarkets 
(Cotterill, 2003; Kilman, 2003; Cotterill and Dhar, 2003; Mohl, 2002).  
The Boston milk market situation is common in many market channels. Private market 
power in processing and retailing often coexists with public policies that affect milk prices. For a 
fair and balanced policy analysis, therefore, such situations require a comprehensive model that 
takes into account both private market power and public policies. In this context, relevant policy 
questions include: What are the independent and joint impacts of private market power and raw 
milk price policies in explaining high consumer prices for milk in Boston? What is the relative 
importance of one vs. the other? When the raw milk price drops, how much of the decrease is 
passed on to consumers and how much is captured into a larger marketing margin? 
This article pursues two objectives: The first is to test for and measure oligopoly power in 
the Boston milk market channel, and the second is to assess the joint and independent impacts of 
private market power and of the NEDC on retail prices for fluid milk in Boston. The analysis is 
based on the oligopoly model of Appelbaum (1982) and the ensuing measures of private market 
power, demand, marginal cost, and the farm-retail price transmission within this structural 2   
model. Counterfactual experiments are also conducted to simulate the alternative scenarios with 
and without private market power and/or the NEDC.  
Empirical findings indicate that approximately 25% of the retail price (or a little less than 
$0.75/gallon) is due to private market power and that although the NEDC did increase the retail 
price of milk, the impact due to private market power is nearly seven times larger. In addition, a 
partial passthrough of the cost of milk helps explain why consumer prices have not come down 
after the elimination of the NEDC, ironically a flagship argument used in its political defeat 
(International Dairy Foods Association, 2001; National Center for Policy Analysis, 2001; Wall 
Street Journal, June 20, 2001).  
2.  The Boston Fluid Milk Market 
The Boston fluid milk market provides a useful case study for a number of reasons. 
Public policies in that market have stirred hot debate in policy and research arenas, particularly 
regarding the NEDC, which established a price floor for raw milk--a public exercise of market 
power.
1 This policy co-existed with increasingly concentrated milk processing and retailing 
sectors that have raised private market power concerns. The Boston milk case also illustrates a 
more general class of economic problems where the relationship between primary producer and 
retail prices appears to be increasingly tenuous.
2 
In the presence of intense opposition by milk retailing and processing industries and 
Midwest dairy farm groups, the NEDC was dismantled in September 2001. The zero-cost to 
taxpayers feature of the NEDC has been replaced by the Milk Income Loss Contract program.
3 
This program, based on the Boston raw milk price, provides a partial subsidy to dairy producers 
nationwide and lowers the acquisition price for raw milk paid by fluid milk processors. It 
benefits consumers to the extent that the cost savings are passed on to them, though in New 3   
England and many other regions this has clearly not happened (Mohl, 2002; Kilman, 2003; 
Brasher, 2000). 
Notably, concentration is taking place in milk processing in the Boston area. By 1999 
Dean Foods became the leading fluid milk processor in the Boston area, accounting for 
approximately 88% of the milk processing capacity in New England (GAO, 2001).
4 
An important feature of channel milk pricing in the Boston area, as in many other areas in 
the country for that matter, is that milk processing on behalf of the retailers is based on cost-plus 
contracts whereby processors charge a fixed markup over the cost of raw milk in a multi-year 
contract setting (Cotterill and Tian, 2004).
5 Milk processing contracted this way accounts for 
approximately 85% of the milk sold in Boston, including all private label and Garelick brands. 
According to cost engineering estimates by Dairy Technomics, milk-processing charges in 
Southern New England averaged approximately $0.60 over the raw milk price in 2003 (Cotterill 
et al., April 2003, Appendix A). Dalton et al. (2002) estimate them at $0.45/gallon in 2000 for 
the state of Maine.
 
At the retail level, the market share of the four top supermarkets (Stop & Shop, Shaw’s, 
DeMoulas, and Star Market) in the Boston area increased from 55% to 70% between 1997 and 
1999 (GAO, June 2001). By July 2000, these supermarkets controlled more than 84% of fluid 
milk sales (Table 1) with Stop and Shop, the market leader, controlling 40% of the market in 
2003 (Cotterill, 2003). 
The supermarkets are clearly the channel captains in the Boston milk market. Their 
private label milk accounts for nearly 70% of total supermarket milk sales. This high percentage 
of private label milk gives them more discretionary pricing power over consumers and may 
perhaps give them some power over processors as well (Narashiman and Wilcox, 1998) when 4   
setting multi-year cost-plus contracts. In addition, retail milk prices across brands and across 
supermarket chains appear to be highly coordinated. Using the four-weekly data from 
Information Resources Incorporated-Infoscan (IRI), the partial correlation coefficient of the 
retail milk prices for these supermarkets ranges from 0.94 to 0.98, and they move together to a 
great extent, as shown in Figure 1. Finally, through enhanced retail configuration, supermarkets 
are able to capitalize on consumers’ desire for one-stop shopping when buying necessities such 
as milk (Bonanno and Lopez, 2003). Thus, high supermarket prices for milk do not cause 
consumers to switch to other retail outlets that may offer lower milk prices. 
High supermarket milk prices have persisted in the Boston area even in the face of 
historically low raw milk prices (Cotterill, 2003). In fact, as Figure 1 shows, the correlation 
between the average retail price and the average raw milk price for milk is rather weak.  The 
coefficient of partial correlation, although positive, is 0.395.  The foregoing suggests the exercise 
of substantial oligopoly power by milk retailers in Boston. 
3. The Model 
  The Boston milk market channel has both processors and retailers beyond the farm gate 
that compete vertically with each other as well as horizontally in their respective markets to 
capture channel profits. Consider several stages of the vertical market channel for fluid milk in 
Boston. Farmers sell their milk to processors at prices fixed by Federal regulation (Federal Milk 
Marketing Order) or the Dairy Compact plus possible over-order premia. Milk processors collect 
the milk, process the raw milk into bottled milk and butterfat, and deliver it to the docks of 
supermarkets. Thus, processors sell fluid milk to supermarkets under cost-plus contracts (the raw 
milk price plus a processing margin, as is in fact the case for most fluid milk in Boston). 
Supermarkets then sell the milk to Boston consumers. This study focuses on oligopoly power in 5   
the latter stage and on the price transmission of raw milk prices to the consumers in reference to 
the NEDC. 
Consider then a fluid milk industry in which N firms distribute a homogeneous good. 







, where  i q  is the quantity of milk supplied by 
supermarket i.  Let the market demand facing the supermarket industry be given by: 
) , ( Z p f Q r = , (1) 
where  pr  is the retail price of milk and Z is a vector of demand shifters. 
  The variable profits made by the i
th retailer are given by: 
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where  w p is the wholesale price charged by milk processors, and  ) , , (
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w i i W p q c is the cost of 
distributing milk incurred by the i
th  firm, and 
R W  is a vector of prices for non-milk inputs 
incurred in retailing fluid milk. 
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where  MCi  ) ln / ln ( i i q c ∂ ∂ = is the marginal cost,  i θ  is a conjectural variation elasticity 
) ln / ln ( i q Q ∂ ∂ = and η is the price elasticity of market demand  ) ln / ln ( r p Q ∂ ∂ = .  
  To infer market power with market level data, two issues arise from equation (3): the 
aggregation of marginal costs and the aggregation of conjectural variation elasticities across 
firms.  As is standard in the literature (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001), we assume a Gorman polar 
form so that marginal costs are constant across firms without implying that their cost functions 
are identical ( MC MC j = ).  Then, as long as the assumption of constant total marginal cost is 6   
maintained, at equilibrium the conjectural elasticities are the same for all retailers ) ( θ θ = j . The 
industry-level Lerner index of oligopoly power is, therefore, given by  . /η θ − = L  
The null hypothesis to test for retail market power concerns the market conduct 
parameter θ and the Lerner index. We also seek to measure whether industry conduct changed 
with the implementation of the NEDC. Was the NEDC a focal point event that supermarkets 
used to significantly elevate the degree of tacit collusion? 
In order to evaluate the impact of the implementation of NEDC on pricing conduct, the 
parameter θ  is allowed to vary with a NEDC dummy variable (NEDC). Assuming the marginal 
























r , (4) 
where the numerator is the retail marginal cost which is a function of the wholesale milk price 
and milk retailing inputs. The terms τ and  j β . 0 θ , 1 θ , and η are parameters and ε1 is a random 
error in optimization.  
  Since nearly all milk is processed under cost-plus contracts, let the following relationship 
define the contracted wholesale price: 
λ + = f w p p ,        ( 5 )    
where f p  is the raw milk price and λ  is a fixed processing margin over the acquisition price of 









0 .  Substituting this expression into (5) and then into the retail marginal cost in 7   
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simplicity, lump the vector of non-milk input prices used in processing and retailing into 
{ }
R P W W W , =  and combine  i β and  j β  into a single vector of parameters (also note that some 
input prices, such as electricity and variable capital services may affect both stages of 
































r      (6) 
whereθ ’s, τ, η and   j β ’s are to be estimated. 
  The market demand function (1) faced by retailers is assumed to take the double 
logarithmic form given by  
2
1





i r Z d p Q ,   (7) 
where ln indicates the natural logarithm operator, Q is the total quantity of fluid milk, d  is a 
price deflator,  i Z  denotes demand shifters, the α ’s and η are parameters to be estimated, and ε2 
is a random error. 
  To determine the impacts of private market power and the NEDC on the retail price, it is 
necessary to separate the two effects. One can decompose equation (6) into four scenarios shown 
in Table 2. Scenario A illustrates the actual situation with simultaneous distortions of private 
market power and the NEDC. Scenario B illustrates the impact of private market power on the 
retail price of fluid milk in the absence of the NEDC. Scenario C illustrates competitive retail 
pricing in the presence of the NEDC, the retail price being equal to marginal cost when the raw 8   
milk price is determined by the NEDC price floor. Scenario D illustrates the impact in the 
absence of private market power and the NEDC and represents the lowest hypothetical price paid 
by consumers.
6  
  It is of particular interest to assess the retail price differential due to the NEDC in the 










AC p p P − = ∆  to assess the price differential due to private market power in the presence of 





AD p p P − = ∆  measures the simultaneous impact of NEDC and private 
market power.  Obviously, the relevant policy change depends on a policy maker’s degree of 
freedom in eliminating market imperfections and the strengths of special interest groups in the 
policy process.
 
To compare our results to previous studies of the effects of NEDC and to assess the 
impact of raw milk price policies on the retail price, the cost passthrough rate for milk 
( f r p p CPTRM ∂ ∂ = / ) is computed as  ] / ) ( 1 /[ 1 0 η θ θ τ NEDC CPTRM + + = . We do not restrict 
the τ  coefficient to any prior value (for instance, the common assumption of fixed proportion of 
one) in order to obtain a passthrough rate that is shaped by the data and the conjectural variation 
and demand elasticities. Note that Bailey’s (2003, p. 120) results are based on a restricted 
proportional markup model given by the ratio of the retail price (or the forecast margin plus farm 
price) over the farm price, which, by definition, always yields a CPTRM greater than one. He 
reports a CPTRM of 1.83 (a 20.7-cent increase in the Boston retail price divided by a 11.3-cent 
increase in the raw milk price). Balagtas and Sumner (2003) assume CPTRM  to be one.  
4. Data and Estimation 
Equations (6) and (7) are the basis for empirically assessing the market power of fluid 
milk retailers in the Boston market and the impact of the NEDC. 9   
  The model is estimated with data from the Boston milk market area.  The core data came 
from the Information Resources Incorporated-Infoscan (IRI) database provided by the Food 
Marketing Policy Center at the University of Connecticut.  It includes 58 four-week-ending 
observations covering the period from March 1996 to July 2000. The IRI data provided the 
values of fluid milk sales by each supermarket chain, the volume sold, and the percentages of 
fluid milk sold under promotion and price reductions. The retail milk price was computed by 
dividing total dollar sales by total volume.  
  The empirical measure of the raw milk price ( f p ) is given by the Federal Milk Market 
Order (FMMO) announced Class I (fluid milk use) price or the announced Compact minimum 
price, whichever is higher. To the resulting price, the average over-order cooperative premium is 
added. Finally, the raw milk price is adjusted for butterfat sales extracted from an average gallon 
of milk sold in Boston to better reflect the true price the processor paid for raw fluid milk in the 
sample period.
7  
The retail marginal cost variable also includes non-milk input prices. These are: the 
average retail wage rate in the Boston area ($/hour) and a U.S. price index for packaging 
materials obtained from the website of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002); the Moody’s 
bond rate for 10 years as an opportunity cost for variable capital inputs obtained from 
Economagic (2004); and the price of electricity for industrial use in Massachusetts obtained from 
the U.S. Department of Energy website (2004).
8 We also include the average volume per unit 
sold, available from IRI as a proxy for the amount of materials and added labor needed to supply 
a given volume of milk.  
Shifters of demand include the percent of milk sold under sales promotion, the percent 
price reduction for promoted milk (through coupons or sales specials), and monthly aggregate 10   
consumer income in the Boston area. Both the retail price of milk and consumer income were 
deflated by the Boston consumer price index. At this level of analysis using scanner data, no 
obvious substitutes or complements for fluid milk were apparent.
9 
  For the counterfactual experiments, note that raw milk prices for scenarios A and C 
(Compact with and without private market power) and for B and D (no Compact with and 
without private market power) are the same in the pre-Compact period. For scenarios A and C, 
the raw milk price used is the same as in the econometric estimation.  
Note that the Boston class I price is set by national Federal guidelines independently of 
the Compact. Thus, for scenarios B and D analyzing prices in the absence of the Compact, the 
raw milk price is assumed to follow the actual Boston class I price plus an estimated coop 
premium
10 plus an adjustment for butterfat. The actual coop premia is used in the adjustment for 
the few observations where the class I price was so high anyway that it was above the Compact 
floor. The estimated average impact of the Compact on raw milk prices is 9 cents per gallon in 
the post-Compact period.  
The system of equations in (4) and (5) is recursive, nonlinear in parameters, and has a 
cross-parameter restriction ) (η . Given the potential endogeneity of the retail milk price in the 
demand equation, the weighted average of the retail milk prices in Providence, Rhode Island, and 
Hartford, Connecticut, was used as an instrumental variable in lieu of the Boston retail price. 
Then, the system of equations was estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
technique. The results are presented in the following section. 
5. Empirical Results 11   
Estimated Parameters 
The parameter estimates for equations (6) and (7) are summarized in Table 3. All results 
appear reasonable and conform to a priori expectations. 
The empirical results indicate that the conjectural variation elasticity estimate either 
before  ) 1409 . 0 ˆ ( 0 = θ  or after the Compact  ) 1592 . 0 ˆ ˆ ( 1 0 = +θ θ  is significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. This means that market conduct is not perfectly competitive.  On the other hand, 
the hypothesis of perfect collusion (θ0 = θ0 + θ1 = 1) was also rejected at the 5% level, meaning 
that retailers are not perfectly collusive either. In addition, the Cournot hypothesis 
1663 . 0 1 0 = + = θ θ θ  (the average Herfindahl index for retail milk sales in Boston during the 
sample period) was also rejected at the 5% level. In fact, a one-sided test shows that conduct is 
more collusive than Cournot behavior; thus, supermarkets do not ignore each other’s actions.
11  
Note that the incremental collusion term after the institution of NEDC  ) ( 1 θ  is positive 
and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Its magnitude suggests that the NEDC did 
have a discernable effect on the conjectural variation elasticity and that the NEDC event may 
have served in part as a focal point for increasing tacit coordination of prices.  
The pre- and post-NEDC Lerner indexes (0.2309 and 0.2609) are also significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. The value of the Lerner index suggests that retailers do exert 
a significant degree of oligopoly power by setting fluid milk retail prices above the level dictated 
by competitive pricing. The markup over the marginal cost, which serves as the competitive 
benchmark, is approximately one-quarter of the retail milk price, although percent markups 
changed little with the Compact. The retail dollar markup before the Compact was estimated at 
$0.6775 and after the Compact at $0.7658 – an 8.83 cent increase. Given that the retail milk 12   
price averaged $2.93 per gallon during the 1996-2000 period, these imply very substantial profit 
margins. 
The marginal retail-level cost estimates average approximately $2.21/gallon for the 
sample period. From an average adjusted raw milk price of approximately $1.33, this amounts to 
an estimate of $0.88/gallon for processing and retailing cost on average. The cost-engineering 
estimate put forward by Cotterill (2003) is around $1/gallon by adding estimates from separate 
cost engineering studies by Durling and Szot (2003) for processing milk in Southern New 
England ($0.60/gallon) and Criner (2003) for retailing it in Maine ($0.42/gallon). After 
correcting for inflation (11% between the June 1998 midpoint and 2003), our estimate is quite 
consistent with these estimates. 
The empirical results further show that the price elasticity of demand for milk at the retail 
level in Boston is estimated at approximately -0.6102, illustrating that fluid milk demand in 
supermarkets is inelastic, consistent with elasticity estimates presented by Johnson, Stonehouse 
and Hassan (1992).
12 The inelastic nature of consumer demand also corroborates the potential for 
the further exercise of oligopoly power if current consolidation trends in processing and retailing 
continue. The coefficient for consumer income is negative although not statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Nonetheless, a negative sign for the income elasticity of fluid milk demand is not 
out of the questions in studies of consumer panels (Huang, 1985 Blaylock and Smallwood, 
1983). 
Impacts of NEDC vs. Private Market Power 
The relative impact of the NEDC on retail milk prices is determined two ways: the 
passthrough rate from farm to consumer price and the simulation of counterfactual experiments 
in Table 2.  13   
The CPTRM for milk is estimated at 0.6758 after the implementation of the NEDC. This 
means that approximately 68% of the changes in the raw milk price are reflected in the final 
price paid by consumers, ceteris paribus. This price transmission estimate is comparable to the 
one found by Lass et al. (2001).
13 This finding helps explain the opposition of processors and 
retailers to policies that increase the raw milk price: as raw milk prices increase, they are only 
able to pass on part of the price increase, thus absorbing nearly 32% of the price increase. The 
partial passthrough also helps explain the rent seeking activities by milk intermediaries who 
supported the new milk price subsidy program that lowers farm level milk prices since channel 
firms are able to retain 32% of the cost savings, thus increasing retail margins. 
The estimated passthrough rate of 0.6758 is in sharp contrast to analyses used to defeat 
the NEDC. For instance, a passthrough of approximately 1.83 proposed by Bailey (2003) and the 
agribusiness lobby under a fixed proportional markup is approximately three times higher than 
the one estimated in this study. Bailey’s estimate implies, for instance, that milk retail prices 
should have dropped by nearly 90 cents per gallon after the 50-cent decrease in the raw milk 
price in December 2001, which clearly did not happen. 
On this point Kilman (2003) notes that the national (rather than Boston’s) milk farm price 
plunge (35% between September 2001 and June 2003) was not been fully passed on to 
consumers (9% drop in the same period). Cotterill (2003) provides some compelling data for 
March 2003: On average, New England farmers were paid $1.03/gallon, milk processors 
received $1.63/gallon and supermarkets charged consumers $3.10/gallon. A 50-cent drop in the 
raw milk price to $1.03 translated into only a 10-cent decline in the consumer price and retail 
margins amounted to $1.47 of the $3.10 price. Without controlling for other factors that affect 
processing and retailing costs, these numbers imply a passthrough between 0.20 and 0.26.  14   
Figure 2 shows the resultant retail prices for fluid milk in Boston under our four 
scenarios. The gaps represent overcharges attributed to retail oligopoly, the NEDC or both. Of 
course, the pre-Compact scenarios for A and B, and C and D are the same. Therefore, only retail 
prices and their differentials during the Compact period are compared (40 observations from July 
1997 through July 2000 in the sample).  
The average retail price under scenario A (private market power and NEDC) in the 
Compact period is approximately $3.055/gallon and under scenario B (retail oligopoly power 
without NEDC) is $2.904. Thus, the average increase in the retail price due to the NEDC in the 
presence of retail oligopoly power (
AB P ∆ ) is approximately $0.151/gallon. This estimate 
includes both the pure price transmission as well as the increase in collusion brought about by 
the Compact.
14 On the other hand, the average retail price under scenario C (perfect competition 
and NEDC) is $2.280/gallon. Thus, in the presence of the NEDC, the average increase in the 
retail price due to oligopoly markup (
AC P ∆ ) is approximately $0.775/gallon. The average retail 
price under scenario D (perfect competition and no NEDC) is $2.234/gallon. Thus, if the retail 
sector were competitive, the average increase in the consumer milk price due to the NEDC 
would have been 4.6 cents, precisely the increase in the raw milk price.
15  
Although the NEDC had a significant impact on retail prices and captured most of the 
media, political and academic attention, the impact of private market power far outweighed the 
impact of the NEDC. In fact, that impact is over seven times the size of the NEDC impact.
16  
6. Concluding Remarks 
  The findings reported in this article strongly support the notion that supra-normal milk 
prices in Boston during the Dairy Compact era were mostly due to the exercise of significant 
private market power and not to the exercise of price enhancement via the NEDC. In fact, they 15   
reveal that retail price increases due to private market power outweighed those caused by the 
Northeast Dairy Compact by nearly 7 times. Oligopoly markups are estimated at approximately 
25% of the retail milk price, translating into an approximately $0.75/gallon overcharge when 
retail prices averaged a little under $3/gallon. The estimated passthrough rate sheds light on the 
lack of response of retail prices to raw milk prices and provides a rationale for rent seeking 
activities by channel firms in support for public policies that lower the acquisition price of raw 
milk.    
  Ultimately, the findings of this study illustrate that inclusion of market power by 
intermediaries should be considered when designing a dairy policy program. Assuming that 
market channels are perfectly competitive or that intermediaries simply use a fixed proportional 
markup pricing rule can lead to deceptive equity and efficiency policy conclusions regarding 
programs that purport to assist dairy farmers and help consumers. Indeed, the new Milk Income 
Loss program has helped smaller dairy farmers and benefited consumers. This study suggests 
that it also produced substantial large benefits to retailers in Boston and other areas of the 
country where retail market power may be high. All these benefits, however, have come at the 
expense of the taxpayer. In this regard, further research on the distribution of program benefits in 
the context of a non-competitive market channel would be extremely useful. This line of inquiry, 
nonetheless, is beyond the scope of this article. 16   
Footnotes 
1
  In July 1997, the NEDC was created with the presumption that it would have several 
desirable social benefits, including providing more stable farm prices without the infusion of 
federal tax dollars. Critics raised major questions concerning the impact of the Compact on 
consumers (i.e., the retail price of fluid milk), the potential spillover price effects to producers in 
other regions, and the effects on processors and retailers (Bailey, 2001). 
 
2
  For a general discussion of this emerging problem in a different industry (electric 
utilities), see Borenstein and Holland (2003). 
 
3  This 3 ½ year program provides a federal payment to producers each month equal to 45% 
of the difference between $16.94 and the Boston Class I price.  Payments are made on up to 2.4 
million pounds of production per year to a producer anywhere in the U.S. This program started in 
the summer 2002 with a budget of $1 billion but has cost over $4.8 billion due to record low 
farm milk prices nationwide. 
 
4.  Dean Foods processes many brands including Garelick, Sealtest, and the private label 
brands of nearly all supermarkets and Wal-Mart in the Boston area. During the period of 
analysis, Stop and Shop --the leading retailer in Boston—was vertically integrated into 
processing not only its own private-label milk but also Hood milk (under licensing), which is the 
leading manufacturer brand. Since then it is operating under a 20-year contract with Dean Foods. 
Either through contractual processing which affects the bulk of fluid milk in the Boston area, or 
though vertical integration, we abstract from questions regarding any market power in the market 
channel other than retailers’ oligopoly power. Several studies also point out the weak oligopoly 
power of milk processors (Suzuki et al., 1994; Liu et al., 1995) or weak price effects of processor 
concentration (Lopez et al., 2002).  
 
5.  An exception is Seattle where most milk processing and retailing is vertically integrated 
via Safeway and Kroger supermarkets. In fact, Seattle has been shown to have the highest retail 
price for milk in the country (Carman and Sexton, 2004). 
 
6.  The two scenarios for “perfect competition” in raw milk pricing (scenarios C and D) refer 
to a situation where the price of raw milk is determined by Federal regulation (class I) rather than 
under a “free market.” A true free market price would involve dismantling of Federal 
involvement, including barriers to international trade. Thus, in a sense, scenario D represents a 
second-best situation taking Federal price regulation as exogenous to the model. 
 
7.  Although we are interested only in fluid milk as the output of milk processing, milk 
butterfat is a byproduct also sold by processors. Thus, to reflect the effective raw milk price paid 
by processors, a “net price” of raw milk is obtained by subtracting byproduct credits from the 
price of butterfat. An alternative specification used in the literature defines the raw milk price as 
milk with 3.5% fat content. This definition, however, ignores the important butterfat sales if one 
is considering fluid milk. On average, butterfat credits amounted to approximately 20 cents per 
gallon of raw milk (13% of the 3.5% fat price) in the period of analysis. However, using this 
alternative definition did not change the results by much as marginal costs and margins turned 17   
out to be very close after posterior adjustment for butterfat credit. Thus, the results were robust 
with respect to the milk price specification and they are available from the authors upon request.  
 
8.  As pointed out by Criner (2003), following an accounting approach for four Maine 
supermarkets, milk retailing costs include both direct and indirect costs. First and foremost, 
direct costs consist of the acquisition price of bottled milk as well as labor and electricity. 
Indirect costs consist of overhead for equipment, salary and retail space. Since we are concerned 
with the marginal cost, rather than the unit total cost, we do not consider explicitly unassigned 
fixed costs. At the processing level, Durling and Szot (2003) include the acquisition price of 
milk, packaging and labor as the determinants of the direct cost of milk processing while making 
allowances for overhead charges for administration, marketing and insurance. Dalton, Criner, 
and Halloran (2002) attribute most milk cost to “supplies” (including packaging and milk) and 
labor. One should also keep in mind that we flush out the marginal cost values via econometrics 
rather than accounting estimation. We attempt to capture marginal retailing cost by including 
labor and energy cost plus the implicit wholesale price charged by processors who deliver the 
milk to the display site in the supermarket. We include the Moody’s bond rate to partially 
capture the variable cost of capital services attached to overhead, including retail space, and a 
marginal cost intercept to allow for other factors not attributable to the included input costs. 
 
9.  Previous studies on milk using scanner data (e.g., Cotterill and Dhar, 2003); Kinoshita et 
al, 2001) typically consider only substitution across brands of milk. Since we have aggregated all 
brands and consider the average price of milk, this possibility is not relevant. In addition, several 
attempts to include the price of orange juice worsened the statistical results without providing 
any additional insight. For completeness, we included the monthly consumer income for Boston 
extrapolated from quarterly data. However, the paucity of the data and the short time span (less 
than five years) of the sample preclude us from estimating a traditional model of demand typical 
of longer time series of annual data. 
 
10.  Over-order payment is a payment above the Federal order minimum prices negotiated 
between buyers and sellers to cover cost of providing market services or attracting adequate milk 
supplies. They can take the form of coop premia or be the result of regulation such as dairy 
Compacts. In the absence of regulation, over-order coop premia (CP) are negatively correlated 
with class I prices (P1) as milk cooperatives would require less compensation when class I prices 
are high. Using the 19 observations before the Compact, the following OLS regression was used 
to estimate the would-be coop premia for periods when the Compact was effective: 
  CPt = 1.2763 – 1.6239P1t + 0.5441 P1t
2,
  
           (2.847)    (2.538)        (2.393) 
where the values in parentheses are the absolute values of the t-statistics, the R
2 =0.566, and 
N=19. For the periods when the Compact was in place but not effective (prices above the price 
floor of $1.46/gallon for 3.5% butterfat milk), the actual premia were used. 
 
11.  An alternative testing for Cournot model was conducted via a J-test since, unlike the 
competitive conduct, that model is non-nested for variables levels of the Herfindahl index. The 
MacKinnon et al. (1983) J-test was used to test the unrestrictedθ  model versus Cournot conduct. 

























































where H is the milk retail Herfindahl index. The value of α for the Cournot case is estimated at  
–0.0351 and its t-ratio was estimated at –1.20025. Thus, the Cournot conduct. Assumption does 
not add any significant information over the unrestricted model. Hence, one reject the Cournot 
model specification in favor of the unrestricted model presented in Table 3. 
 
12.
  This estimate is not as inelastic as is commonly found in consumer panel studies (e.g.,         
 -0.2588 by Huang, 1985). However, it is lower than those found at the individual supermarket 
level (e.g., -2.6 in Cotterill and Dhar, 2003; -1.47 to –5.0 in Kinoshita et al., 2001). 
 
13.  Converting the estimates of CPRTM in Table 3 to mean elasticities (by multiplying them 
by the mean of  r f p p / ), the transmission elasticities are estimated at 0.3311 before the Compact 
and 0.2911 after the Compact (cf. 0.35 in the study of Lass et al (2001)). 
 
14.  In comparison, Bailey (2003) concluded that the NEDC’s impact was much higher at 
20.7 cents per gallon. Dhar (2001) found price increases ranging from 7 to 17 cents for different 
brands of milk at the supermarket level in the Boston area. Lass et al. (2001) found an average 
effect of the Compact on Boston retail prices of 6.9 cents per gallon. Thus, the magnitude of the 
price increase found in this paper (15.1 cents) is in the range of those in previous studies. 
 
15.    For the full sample (58 observations) including the pre-Compact period, the average 
prices were as follows: $2.948 for scenario A, $2.831 for B, $2.209 for C, and $2.177 for D. 
 
16.  For a more recent evaluation of the impact of public vs. private market power in New 
England milk market channels see Cotterill (2003) where a 10:1 ratio of private to public price 
enhancement in these channels is reported.  19   
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Milk Retailers in Boston 
Characteristic  Stop & Shop  Shaw’s  DeMoulas  Star Market  Others 
Milk Market Share (%)  27.04  20.50  18.44  12.71  21.31 
Grocery Market Share  30.67  16.75  12.52  13.58  26.48 
In-Store Private Label Milk 
Share (%) 
68.07 68.78  87.48  48.94  na 
Average Store Square Footage 
(1000) 
83.44 40.90  40.59  38.18 20.99 
Source: IRI and Market Scope (Trade Dimensions), 1996-2000. 
 
Table 2. Retail Prices under Alternative Scenarios 
NEDC No  NEDC 
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Notes: 
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0 β β  
is the non-milk marginal cost. 
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Retail Pricing and Demand in the Boston Milk Market. 
Variable Parameter(s)  Estimate  T-ratio 
Pricing Equation      
Pre-NEDC Conj Var. El  0 θ   0.1409*** 2.5201 
NEDC Dummy  1 θ   0.0184*** 2.3896 
Post-NEDC Conj. Var. El.  1 0 θ θ +   0.1592*** 2.5467 
Raw Milk Price  τ   0.4995*** 7.0176 
MC Constant  0 β   -2.8376*** 2.4885 
Retail Wage Rate  1 β   0.2131*** 12.1280 
Packaging Price Index  2 β   0.0086* 1.5468 
Electricity Price  3 β   0.0189 1.4332 
Interest Rate  4 β   0.0344 1.4437 
Volume per Unit  5 β   -0.0109 0.0888 
Marginal Cost  NMMC p f + τ   2.2096*** 412.2374 
Price Elasticity of Demand  η  -0.6102*** 2.5397 
Demand Equation      
Constant  0 α   18.0620 4.6849 
Retail Price  η  -0.6102*** 2.5397 
Percent Promotion  1 α   0.0021* 1.8559 
Percent Price Reduction 
Income 
2 α  





Related Measures      
Pre-NEDC:      
Lerner Index   η θ / 0 −   0.2309*** 58.0367 
Dollar Markup  ( η θ / 0 − ) r p  0.6775*** 58.0337 
Price Transmission  η θ β / 1 /( 0 1 + )  0.6494*** 7.1072 
Post-NEDC:      
Lerner Index   η θ θ / ) ( 1 0 + −   0.2609*** 102.3701 
Dollar Markup  ( η θ θ / ) ( 1 0 + − ) r p  0.7658*** 102.3701 
Price Transmission  ) / ) ( 1 /( 1 0 1 η θ θ β + +   0.6758*** 4.0063 
Notes:  Two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
N=58 four-weekly observations between March 1996 and July 2000.  T-statistics are in absolute 
value and are calculated relative to the null hypothesis that the parameter is zero. Non-milk 
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Figure 1. Farm and Retail Milk Prices at the Top Four Supermarkets in Boston, March 






















































































































































































Farm Price Average Boston Stop & Shop Shaw's Demoulas Star Market
NEDC
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